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ABSTRACT: In this paper I defend the idea that we need a metaphysical theory to justify 
identity-related practical concerns, such as self-concern. I outline D. Parfit’s theory, 
in which the concerns receive a metaphysical justification. Then, I focus on two ob-
jections: C. Korsgaard’s claim that the concerns are justified by the unity of agency, 
and M. Johnston’s contention that the concerns are prima facie justified independ-
ently of a metaphysical theory. I argue that even if these theories have a point, they 
do not cover a range of situations in which justification may be sought. It is in these 
situations that a metaphysical theory may find its place.
KEYWORDS: Justification, metaphysics, personal identity, practical concerns.
Introduction
There are at least two major trends that can be traced in the metaphysics of 
personal identity. One trend seeks to develop a theory of personal identity 
to cohere with the broader picture of the identity and persistence of spatio-
temporal objects. The other attempts to develop a theory of personal identity 
to justify some of the practical concerns and attitudes that have tradition-
ally been taken to presuppose the concept of personal identity, such as self-
concern, responsibility, compensation, blame, among others. Ideally, these 
theories should cohere in one unifying, practically relevant theory of personal 
identity. However, this ideal has turned out to be very difficult to achieve. The 
difficulty has been demonstrated clearly in Derek Parfit’s theory and conclu-
sions, which stated that identity does not matter for our practical concerns. 
(Parfit 1984) The number of papers discussing the details of Parfit’s theory 
and the legitimacy of his conclusions is immense. However, less attention has 
been paid to the very assumption that it rests on: that the practical concerns 
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derive their justification from a metaphysical theory of personal identity. 
Some authors have attacked this assumption, claiming that the justification 
of the concerns is ultimately practical and that any metaphysical theory at-
tempting to provide reasons for these concerns is irrelevant.1 In this paper I 
will focus on two of such challenges and discuss whether they pose a threat to 
the metaphysical justification of the concerns, offer a viable alternative and, if 
so, leave room for any practical relevance of metaphysical theories.
First, I will focus on Parfit’s theory, showing the relevant details of his 
methodology and setting out the basis for some of the key challenges in re-
spect of this. I will then present Christine Korsgaard’s challenge that Parfit’s 
revisionary conclusions only follow because he ignores the view that personal 
identity is a practical, not theoretical concept, and that persons are agents 
who determine their own identity. I will then focus on Mark Johnston’s chal-
lenge that the practical concerns need no metaphysical justification, because 
they are prima facie justified. I will go on to show that, even if Korsgaard and 
Johnston are right, there remains room for a metaphysical theory of personal 
identity.
Parfit’s theory
Many people believe that the persistence of people is secured by psychologi-
cal continuity. In part 3 of Reasons and Persons (Parfit 1984) Parfit defines 
psychological continuity as a chain of strong connectedness, where connect-
edness consists of the holding of particular direct psychological causal con-
nections, such as an experience and a memory of it, an intention and an 
experience of executing it, and the persistence of a belief or a character trait. 
The beings that are unified by psychological continuity are termed persons. 
The beings that are unified by strong connectedness are selves. There are dif-
ferent theories about what enables connectedness. Non-reductionist theories 
hold that it is the existence of a continuous psychological subject, such as the 
soul or the res cogitans, that figures as the common subject of the various 
experiences in time. Parfit shows that non-reductionism is implausible. He 
believes that connectedness is the result of the existence of the body, brain 
and the related physical and psychological processes which together consti-
tute the subject. He further argues that the physical aspect of continuity, that 
is, the continuous existence of the same brain is not important. Thus, the 
persistence of persons can be explained solely by reference to the existence 
of a chain of interrelated psychological events and processes. The problem is 
that psychological continuity as such is purely formal and, thus, replicable. 
That is, one may be psychologically continuous with a number of numeri-
1 The methodological alternatives are summarized and assessed in Shoemaker (2012).
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cally distinct people. This intransitivity makes psychological continuity un-
suitable as a criterion of numerical identity. This, however, need not trouble 
us, according to Parfit, because numerical identity is not important. The fact 
of numerical identity obtains when there is only one formal continuer of a 
person. But nothing important rests on there being just one such continuer. 
All that matters to us is psychological continuity and connectedness – rela-
tion R – not that it holds uniquely. Thus, it is R, not identity, which grounds 
our practical concerns.
One practical consequence of reductionism could be viewed as the dissi-
pation of the self. If identity does not matter, one should be content with the 
mere existence of experiences causally connected to one’s current experiences. 
Thus, if I intend to construct a nuclear fusion machine, it does not matter 
whether I accomplish that myself during my lifetime, or whether my son 
finishes it according to my instructions. The fact that the causal chain leaves 
my body is unimportant. What matters is the existence of mental states caus-
ally linked to my own mental states. Thus, every time I succeed in making 
such a link to another person, they carry part of what matters to me. “Me”, 
then, exists scattered in the impressions I make on people. This has further 
consequences for some of the practical concerns. For instance, it is rational 
for me to care for others who are linked to me in this way. Also, it may not be 
immoral to compensate others for burdens imposed on me, as long as there 
is such a causal link between us.
Another practical consequence of reductionism results from the fact that 
part of relation R, namely connectedness, holds in degrees. That is, I may 
be more or less connected to my future and past selves. Thus, if R justifies 
attributions of responsibility, I may be less responsible for the actions of my 
distant past self than for my yesterday’s self. Similarly, if R is what justifies 
the rationality of my concern for the future inhabitant of my body, when R 
holds to a low degree, so should my concern. This aspect, in turn, leads to 
an increase in the plausibility of paternalism, because great imprudence with 
respect to my distant future self is seen as violating my obligations to others, 
rather than myself, thus becoming immoral, rather than irrational.
These revisions of practical concerns follow, according to Parfit, from 
the acceptance of the correct metaphysical picture of the nature of people. 
For simplicity, I will mainly focus on one of the concerns – self-concern – in 
the rest of the paper.
Korsgaard’s challenge
According to Korsgaard (Korsgaard 1989), there are two sides to a person. A 
person as a passive entity is the subject of experiences. As an active entity it is 
an agent, a doer of deeds. She believes that Parfit wrongly bases his theory on 
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the passive aspect only, seeking unity of experience and reducing agency to a 
form of it. She proposes that if we concentrate on the active aspect of persons, 
then the conclusions Parfit comes to do not follow.
Korsgaard agrees with Parfit that practical concerns are grounded in unity, 
but she rejects the view that that the relevant unity is a metaphysical unity 
of experiences. Instead, she suggests it is the unity of agency which grounds 
the concerns. For Korsgaard, metaphysics does not determine whether one 
should be self-concerned about a future person. In her opinion, even if I am 
only weakly connected to a future self of mine, I should still feel self-concern 
for the self, because the self will still be the same agent as me out of practical 
necessity.
This is important, because if it turns out that practical necessity provides 
a strong unity relation, then the fact that our metaphysical unity is weak does 
not justify the revision in practical concerns that Parfit proposes, and meta-
physical theories of personal identity become irrelevant for the justification 
of the practical concerns.
On the other hand, if we can show that practical necessity doesn’t pro-
vide a strong unity relation, the revision of the practical concerns may be 
in place and we may still need a metaphysical theory of personal identity to 
guide us in the revision.
Let us see, then, what the practical necessity that Korsgaard refers to 
consists in. Korsgaard begins her account with an explanation of the neces-
sity of unity at a time. A major role in this type of practical unity is played by 
the fact that even though I might simultaneously have conflicting desires and 
intentions, giving me the impression that there are more subjects in my body, 
I am eventually bound to come to a single unanimous decision, because I 
only have one body to act with. So it is the fact that I have a single body which 
prevents me from carrying out simultaneous incompatible acts.
Another aspect of the necessity of unity at a time is that people deliberate 
from a particular standpoint. For example, I have desires that may conflict, 
but I also have desires about the desires. These give me reasons for weighing 
the first-order desires and choosing among them. I do not feel that I passively 
wait to see which desire happens to win. I feel that I actively choose among 
them and choose according to a principle that is expressive of my will. The 
identification with a principle of choosing, an identification which I must do to 
act, is, then, another aspect of the necessity of unity at a time.
Korsgaard admits, though, that in the process of identification with a 
principle of choosing, one may be guided by metaphysical considerations. 
That is, I may decide on particular acts affecting the well-being of a future 
person on the basis of a belief that the person will be me, for instance. She 
believes, however, that there are more important grounds for such identi-
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fication, which are independent of any metaphysical beliefs and which are 
imposed on us by the necessity to act.
Korsgaard concedes that what has been said about unity at a time is fully 
compatible with the idea that a body is occupied by nothing but a chronology 
of instantaneous conscious subjects (Korsgaard 1989: 112). That is, it is fully 
compatible with the idea that there is no unity over time. So an argument is 
needed to show that diachronic unity is practically necessary, too. Korsgaard 
claims that if the subjects want to have any kind of a life, they have to form 
a unity. Life does not consist in a series of temporally isolated experiences. 
Living a life means having plans and projects that take time; and having and 
completing a project requires my cooperation with the future inhabitants of 
my body and my identification with their expected needs and desires. This 
identification is confirmed each time we brush our teeth or exercise, as we 
project ourselves to the future and see our lives from the perspective of the 
future inhabitants of our bodies. The identification with these future selves is 
what actually gives us reasons for our current choices and actions. This is why 
Korsgaard says: “… to the extent that you regulate your choices by identify-
ing yourself as the one who is implementing something like a particular plan 
of life, you need to identify with your future in order to be what you are even 
now” (Korsgaard 1989: 113–114, original emphasis). Since we only have one 
body and one life to live, it follows that we must consider ourselves as unified 
over time: “The unity of our life is forced upon us, although not deeply, by 
our shared embodiment, together with our desire to carry on long-term plans 
and relationships” (Korsgaard 1989: 113).
With the concept of unity of agency, Korsgaard explains the unity of 
consciousness. For her, unity of consciousness is just an instance of the unity 
of agency. The unity of consciousness is the absence of any difficulty coordi-
nating and integrating conscious activities.2 Such coordination is only pos-
sible if there is some form of communication between the different conscious 
parts; and communication is preconditioned by the unity of agency.
Like Parfit, Korsgaard draws an analogy between the unity of persons 
and the unity of certain groups. Parfit argues that persons are like nations. 
The existence of nations consists in the existence of people living on a terri-
tory. If a nation mingles with a great number of immigrants over the course 
of several decades while its territory expands, there is no fact of the matter 
as to whether it is the same nation. Similarly for persons – the existence of 
a person amounts to the existence of a body, a brain and a series of inter-
related physical and mental events. If a substantial amount of these is lost 
or replaced, the identity of the person becomes indeterminate. Korsgaard 
believes persons should rather be likened to states. States, unlike nations, 
2 For a critique of this claim, see Shoemaker (1996: 323–324).
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are formal entities defined by their constitutions and deliberative procedures 
whose citizens have actively constituted themselves into a single agent, have 
adopted ways of resolving conflicts, making decisions, interacting with other 
states and planning together for an ongoing future (Korsgaard 1989: 114). 
Korsgaard believes that the turning of a nation into a state is pragmatically 
necessary, and so is, analogically, the turning of a bundle of experiences into 
a person:
When a group of human beings occupy the same territory, for instance, they 
have an imperative need to form a unified state. And when a group of psy-
chological functions occupy the same human body, they have an even more 
imperative need to become a unified person. This is why the human body must 
be conceived as a unified agent. (Korsgaard 1989: 115)
The final sentence of this quotation illustrates a point worth stressing: no 
matter how many conscious subjects might there be in the history of a single 
body, they are all bound to be unified into a single agent by the desire to 
live a life and by sharing the same body. Korsgaard re-emphasizes this point 
at another place: “So long as I occupy this body and live this life, I am this 
rational agent, the same one” (Korsgaard 1989: 126). That does not mean, 
however, that an agent cannot form larger unities with other agents based on 
common projects and plans. Families, companies and political parties may 
all be unified by the very same relation that unifies conscious subjects within 
one body, which also justifies the extension of self-concern to these entities 
(Korsgaard 1989: 127). Korsgaard’s point is, rather, that the minimal extent 
of an agent equals to that of one life lived in one body. Importantly, the 
claim that all of the conscious subjects sharing a body are necessarily unified 
is needed to block Parfit’s conclusion that self-concern may reasonably fade 
proportionally to the reduction of psychological unity. If all subjects in a 
body are unified out of practical necessity, as Korsgaard claims, no reduction 
of self-concern is warranted.
There is one fundamental difference from Parfit’s theory that emerges 
in Korsgaard conception of the unity of agency. As we have seen, in Parfit’s 
theory the metaphysical unity of people is provided by relation R, part of 
which is the scalar relation of connectedness, and when connectedness wanes, 
so does unity. Thus, the persistence of a person is inconsistent with sudden 
drastic psychological changes which disrupt psychological continuity. How-
ever, if one introduces the idea of agency into the picture, this need not be 
so. Agency involves regarding oneself as the originator and author of one’s 
actions. The relation between an agent and experiences or actions which the 
agent actively arrives at, is convinced of, decides on or endorses, Korsgaard 
terms “authorial connectedness”. Authorial connections enjoy a privileged 
status among other psychological connections – if the psychological changes 
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are the result of your active decision and identification with the product of 
the changes, you will remain the same agent even if the changes are drastic. 
On the other hand, Korsgaard also discusses thought experiments about mad 
surgeons (Korsgaard 1989: 122–123), involving drastic external interference 
with a person’s psychological continuity. In one such experiment, a man is 
seized by someone who tells him that he is going to be tortured the next day. 
Before that, however, all of his memories will be wiped out and replaced 
by a complete set of new memories. Korsgaard agrees that in such cases the 
changes bring about the loss of the person’s identity. But this is not so much 
due to the intrinsic nature of the changes, but rather to the external and un-
authorized origin of the changes.
The implications for self-concern are obvious. Where one actively iden-
tifies with the changes to occur, they have reasons for concern even if the 
changes disrupt psychological continuity. Suppose, hypothetically, that, like 
the character Joel in the film Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, you de-
cided to have a substantial portion of memories wiped out, which would lead 
to a substantial disruption of psychological continuity. Nevertheless, because 
it was your decision to initiate such a profound change, you would have rea-
sons to identify with and feel concern for the person occupying your body 
after the change.
An assessment of Korsgaard’s challenge
Before I raise some objections to Korsgaard’s theory, it is important to clarify 
what exactly it is that I target and want to achieve. Let me, therefore, briefly 
recapitulate. Parfit argues that with the truth of reductionism come impor-
tant implications for our identity-related practical concerns. Particularly, 
where the metaphysical relations that unify people weaken, the practical con-
cerns may legitimately weaken as well. The case which I find most illustrative 
is the relationship between people and their distant future selves, such as the 
relationship between a carefree teenager and the grumpy old man who will 
occupy his body in sixty years. On Parfit’s theory, if the teenager is weakly 
psychologically connected to the old man, his feeling little self-concern for 
the old man’s well-being may not be irrational, because the man, while being 
the same person, is a different self. For Korsgaard, these theoretical consid-
erations do not determine the rationality of self-concern. Instead, practical 
considerations do so. And if we focus on these, we must see that the teenager 
is the same agent as the old man, because he only has one body and one life 
to live, and in order to live that life he must identify with all the conscious 
subjects that will occupy his body. In the next few paragraphs I would like to 
show that although people desire to live and they only have one body, they 
frequently fail to have projects that span their whole lives, fail to derive rea-
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sons for their current decisions from the distant future selves, and, thus, they 
fail to form agential unity with their distant future selves. As a result, many 
people’s actual lives cast doubt on the thesis that all conscious subjects in one 
body are necessarily unified into a single agent. But since we have seen that 
one needs this thesis in order to block Parfit’s revisions of self-concern and 
other practical concerns, it follows that the revisions withstand Korsgaard’s 
challenge.
Before I elaborate on this further, however, I shall first focus on Kors-
gaard’s analogy of persons and states to see whether it provides good reasons 
to accept the necessity of the unity of agency.
The unity of states
As we have seen, Korsgaard likens the pragmatic unity of agents to the unity 
of states. Let us see, then, to what extent the unity of states is pragmatically 
necessary. Korsgaard claims that when a group of human beings occupy the 
same territory, they have an imperative need to form a state. However, history 
gives us plenty of examples that refute this alleged necessity of unification. 
Firstly, there are groups of people or nations that have been unified with a 
larger group on a territory against their will or who have been hesitant about 
the need for unification: the Baltic states, which were annexed to the Soviet 
Union in 1940; the Québécois in Canada who have held two referenda on 
sovereignty; and the nationalists in Northern Ireland are just a few. Secondly, 
there are groups who have freely declined to join with larger unions, such as 
Switzerland or Norway with respect to the EU. Of course, the EU is not a 
state, but it is a clear example of the unity of agency. Thirdly, there are states 
that have disunited, such as Czechoslovakia in 1993, in spite of sharing com-
mon history on the same territory. The historical experience of these groups 
suggests that the need for unification is not an imperative.
It may be argued that these are not counterexamples to the necessity 
thesis: in each case, the reluctance to join, or the desire to part, may be viewed 
as the result of a stronger sense of unity within a sub-group, and a fear of the 
loss of identity within the larger political or economic unit. But then the 
argument rests on what is meant by “occupying the same territory”. If the 
argument is not to turn into a triviality (in which “the same territory” simply 
means an area inhabited by a group of cooperating agents), the notion of 
territory must be given an independent demarcation, such as a geographi-
cal boundary. Is Europe, then, such a territory? If so, Switzerland refutes the 
necessity of the unity of agency. If not, is Germany, for instance, such a ter-
ritory? It is true that the German people were forcibly disunited after WWII 
and reunited after the fall of the iron curtain. But some current opinions 
advocate that the reunification has not been very successful and is not consid-
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ered a need by many (Fuchs 2008; Zeitchik 2003). These issues suggest that 
the necessity of unity is conditional upon the need and willingness of a group 
of people to cooperate. In fact, Korsgaard’s notion of the unity of agency is 
best interpreted as intentional cooperation. But people living in an inde-
pendently demarcated territory may not always need or be willing to do so. 
It may be likely that if you put a group of people on such a territory, unities 
will quickly and naturally emerge. But it is by no means necessary that one 
encompassing unity within the territory will form. The situation in which 
the protagonists in The Lord of the Flies found themselves called for unity as 
acutely as any, yet they failed to co-operate as one body.
I conclude, then, that historical perspective shows that the unity of states 
is not pragmatically necessary and is a weak analogy to use to argue for the 
necessary unity of individual agency.
It may also be argued, however, that while the analogy is not watertight, 
the comparison with the unity of states illustrates the basic mechanisms un-
derpinning a need for unification, which, although not quite necessary in the 
case of states, are always present in the case of persons. The crucial difference 
between states and people that might support this view lies in the spatial di-
visibility of territories and bodies respectively. While a group of people who 
wish to disunite are not bound by essential indivisibility of the territory and 
can easily form independent functional units in its sub-regions, the human 
body cannot be functionally disintegrated in a similar manner. It is physi-
cally impossible for the human body to separate into multiple independently 
controlled units. The human body, by its very nature, must exist as a physi-
cally integrated whole, and, regardless of the number of potential subjects of 
experience that might occupy it, they must exhibit unity of action in order 
to live. If that is so, people might still be unified in virtue of having just one 
indivisible body.
This idea may be plausible in the case of unity at a time. However, it is 
far less plausible in the case of temporal unity. In what follows, I will argue 
even though to carry out a long-term plan people have to identify with the 
future selves that are part of the plan, this does not mean that people have to 
identify with all the conscious subjects that will occupy their bodies in the 
future. This is because people, as a matter of fact, may not have plans long-
term enough to include distant future selves.
The temporal extent of projects
As we have seen, according to Korsgaard, living a life consists in planning 
and executing projects. It is the projects that force the person’s identification, 
that is, authorial connectedness with a future self. The problem is that peo-
ple’s projects hardly ever span the extent of whole lives. Korsgaard may have 
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shown that in order to carry out a plan, unity is required. But what she has 
failed to show is that these plans that people have and derive reasons from 
span their whole lives. But that is precisely what needs to hold for Korsgaard 
to be able to draw the conclusion that the fact that a future person will oc-
cupy my body forces me to identify with the person. I only have such an 
imperative if the future person is involved in my projects. But if my projects 
do not reach far enough in the future, there will be some future conscious 
inhabitants of this body that I do not currently identify with and, therefore, 
do not form unity with in order to carry out the projects. In other words, 
Korsgaard only shows that there must be unity in one project team, and I 
fully agree with that. She does not show, however, that the team necessarily 
consists of all the occupants of one body.
The question whether people’s projects span their lives is an empirical 
one and evidence seems to support the claim that people’s lives are not uni-
fied in the manner Korsgaard supposes them to be. First of all, there are self-
reports of episodics. Galen Strawson (Strawson 2004), who claims to be one of 
them, describes episodics as people who do not figure themselves, considered 
as selves, as something that was there in the (further) past and will be there in 
the (further) future (Strawson 2004: 430). Strawson describes a self as “that 
which I now experience myself to be when I am apprehending myself specifi-
cally as an inner mental presence or self ” (Strawson 2004: 433). Although he 
recognizes that as a human being he is one continuous entity, considered as a 
self, the events in his remoter past and future did not/will not happen to him. 
At the same time he claims that he does not have any deep interest in his past 
or concern for his future:
As for my practical concern for my future, which I believe to be within the 
normal human range (low end), it is biologically – viscerally – grounded and 
autonomous in such a way that I can experience it as something immediately 
felt even though I have no significant sense that I* will be there in the future. 
(Strawson 2004: 434)3
Although Strawson’s claims are primarily targeted at narrative theories of per-
sonal identity, they apply to Korsgaard’s agential theory as well. Strawson’s 
explicit admission of the lack of unity with his distant past and future selves, 
while admitting that he is one continuous human being, clearly suggests that 
Korsgaard’s claim that the conscious subjects occupying one body must be 
conceived of as a unified agent does not have universal acceptance. In fact, 
several empirical experiments show that Strawson’s remark about people’s 
practical concern for their future being low end expresses a relatively perva-
sive feature of human lives.
3 Roughly, Strawson uses “I*” to refer to himself as a self (as defined above), while “I” for 
himself as a human being. 
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A number of experiments have focused on the future orientation of 
people, including issues such as planning, future concern, inter-temporal 
choices, consequence anticipation, the subjective value of future gains and 
losses. There is a salient group of people that on the face of it appear to refute 
Korsgaard’s views about the practical necessity of unity – adolescents. There 
is a popular stereotype that adolescents are notoriously shortsighted, incapa-
ble of making long-term plans and commitments and anticipating the conse-
quences of their acts. If living a life amounted to having long-term projects, 
many adolescents could not be described as living lives in Korsgaardian terms. 
It may be objected, though, that adolescents cannot constitute a counterex-
ample, as the research that confirms this stereotype also shows that their low 
rate of future orientation is associated with the underdevelopment of several 
psychological faculties and brain functions. These may involve the immature 
formal operational thinking observed in adolescents, along with limitations 
in working memory, the slow maturation of prefrontal cortex and the in-
crease in reward salience caused by the hormonal changes in puberty. (Stein-
berg, et al. 2009) It could be claimed that adolescents are not yet mature 
agents, which society recognizes by denying them certain rights and curbing 
the demands we place on them.
However, further research shows that adolescents may only be worse 
at what adults are actually quite poor at, namely long-term future orienta-
tion. Economists have studied an aspect of future orientation under the term 
temporal discounting and have confirmed that people show relatively less re-
gard for delayed gains and losses compared to immediate ones. Indeed, the 
assumption that they do so is a standard assumption in economic research 
(Löckenhoff, O’Donoghue and Dunning 2011). One study showed that 14 
to 15-year-old adolescents discounted the value of $1,000 to be received in a 
year to only $343. Adults aged between 26 and 30 years old were shown to 
discount the same $1000 to $442, within the same time horizon (Steinberg, 
et al. 2009). The monetary representation of the discount rate illustrates that, 
while more future-oriented than adolescents, adults still show a notable dis-
interest in future outcomes (Löckenhoff, O’Donoghue and Dunning 2011). 
Apart from age, differences in temporal discounting have also been correlated 
with cultural differences (Du, Green and Myerson 2002) and social roles 
(Trommsdorff 1986). This suggests that the general human tendency to dis-
count the future has both quantitative and qualitative individual variations.
Explanations for this phenomenon have varied, but a general explana-
tory pattern may be proposed. Future orientation emerges from the interplay 
of two brain systems. The socioemotional or “hot system” mediates impul-
sivity and reward seeking, while the cognitive or “cool system” is respon-
sible for impulse control and deliberative abstract reasoning. Even though 
with increasing age, the balance between the two systems shifts in favor of 
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the cool system, enabling adults to down-regulate the decision-related emo-
tional responses which appear to push adolescents to seek immediate rewards 
(Löckenhoff, O’Donoghue and Dunning 2011), this does not eliminate the 
general tendency to discount future outcomes.
Some authors suggest that future orientation is a multidimensional con-
struct which includes: rational anticipation of future consequences; premedi-
tation; and the length of time one is able to project one’s imagined life into 
the future (temporal extension). Other factors may include the optimism 
or pessimism about one’s future and the extent to which one thinks one has 
control over one’s future. Steinberg et al (2009) suggest that each of these 
require a separate line of explanation. What is salient is that the cited compo-
nents of future orientation behavior can reasonably be supposed to play a key 
role in the formation and extent of projects and plans which, according to 
Korsgaard, constitute our lives and determine reasons for our actions. These 
findings suggest that one’s future orientation has limited temporal extent, be-
ing rich and vivid in the near future and fading with time.
The temporal extent of the unity of agency
We have seen that Korsgaard, after all, admits that one may fail to connect 
authorially to a future self. This can happen if one is changed by external in-
tervention against one’s will. So it must be admitted that the unification of all 
conscious subjects occupying a body may not always be necessary.
David Shoemaker (Shoemaker 1996) shows, however, that it is not just 
in cases of external intervention that one may fail to connect to conscious 
subjects that share one’s body. He describes a case, focusing on past orien-
tation, in which an eighty-year-old woman examines actions that she per-
formed as a twenty-year-old and realizes that she actually wants to distance 
herself from the values, beliefs and actions of the twenty-year-old and achieve 
an attitude of indifference toward her (Shoemaker 1996: 330). Shoemaker 
argues that this case constitutes an example of authorial disconnectedness, that 
is, a state of disunity resulting not from external intervention, but from wilful 
and deliberate personal decision to cut oneself off from one’s past.
While one may wonder whether it is psychologically possible to become 
absolutely indifferent to one’s past, I believe that the case does show that one 
can actually become opposed to the principles that once determined one’s 
decisions and actions. The person distancing herself in such a way is explicitly 
refusing to become a member of the previous self ’s project team, and refusing 
to continue living the life that the previous self had planned. So I do agree 
that this is another case that casts doubt on Korsgaard’s claim that as long as 
one occupies the same body and lives the same life, one is the same rational 
agent.
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The research outlined above, however, shows still another mode of non-
identification, and one, which, I believe, is much more widespread. While 
the case outlined by Korsgaard is one of unauthorized external interference, 
and the case defended by Shoemaker is one of deliberate internal change and 
dissociation, the research suggests a passive and unintended failure to identify 
with one’s future selves.
The findings may imply several things relevant for Korsgaard’s claims. 
Firstly, it seems that even if people desire to live and, as things stand, can 
only live in one body, they cannot always be considered unified with their 
distant future selves. Secondly, when people derive reasons for their current 
acts, the strongest reasons usually come from their identification with nearer 
future selves, not the ones in distant future. Lastly, living a life may consist in 
having plans and projects, but these are usually shorter-term than Korsgaard 
supposes them to be.
I shall have more to say about the implications for the role of metaphys-
ics in personal identity once I have assessed the other challenge. Let me, thus, 
turn to it now.
Johnston’s challenge
Let me now turn to Mark Johnston’s argument presented in his “Human 
Concerns Without Superlative Selves” (Johnston 1997). Johnston objects to 
Parfit’s theory that the revision of practical concerns that Parfit suggest does 
not follow from his rejection of non-reductionism.
First, Johnston shows that Parfit’s position is best interpreted as ontologi-
cal reductionism. According to this doctrine, the existence of a person consists 
in the existence of a body with a brain and the physical and mental proc-
esses occurring in them. At the same time, a person is not identical to the 
sum of these entities, because people and bodies have different persistence 
conditions. Rather, people are constituted by bodies. According to Johnston, 
because people are not identical to their bodies, it follows that the fact that a 
person exists is different from the fact that a body exists.
Non-reductionism, Parfit’s target, embodies the claim that a person is 
neither identical to, nor constituted by the body. The existence of people, 
therefore, is completely independent of the existence of bodies.
Johnston claims that although in both conceptions the existence of a 
person is a fact that is different from the fact that a body exists, there is an 
important difference. The facts that are based on the relation of constitu-
tion, Johnston terms ordinary further facts. The facts of non-reductionism are 
termed superlative further facts. Superlative further facts inflate our ontology. 
The existence of a soul or a res cogitans, independent of the underlying physi-
328 Prolegomena 13 (2) 2014
cal and mental phenomena, would further extend the list of the fundamental 
entities. Ordinary further facts are ontologically innocent – the only entities 
that exist are bodies, brains and the relevant processes, and the obtaining of 
the facts about persons adds nothing to this list. In Johnston’s words, making 
statements in the discourse in question carries no commitment to entities 
other than those spoken of in some other, philosophically favoured discourse 
(Johnston 1997: 262).
Parfit’s mistake, Johnston claims, is that showing that there are no super-
lative further facts does not justify the conclusion that the practical concerns 
that seem to have tracked the superlative further facts are unjustified. John-
ston purports that even in the absence of superlative further facts, the practi-
cal concerns are reasonable and justified prima facie. If this is so, he suggests 
that no revision of our practical concerns as defended by Parfit is necessary.
Self-concern and self-referential concern
Johnston defends a position which he terms Minimalism. According to mini-
malism, “metaphysical pictures of the justificatory undergirdings of our prac-
tices do not represent the real conditions of justification of those practices” 
(Johnston 1997: 260–261). The contention is, therefore, that the metaphysi-
cal pictures are mere theoretical epiphenomena that spring from the reflec-
tion on the practices, but do not have any significant impact on them.
Johnston focuses primarily on self-concern. He believes that self-con-
cern does not require the existence of a continuing soul or a res cogitans for 
its justification. That is, the justification is not grounded in a superlative 
further fact. Self-concern derives its justification from the fact that it is one 
of self-referential concerns, “directed outwards from one’s present self to one’s 
future self, one’s friends, family, acquaintances, neighbourhood, and so on” 
(Johnston 1997: 268). In each of these concerns we care about the objects in 
a non-derivative way, for their own sake, and having these concerns is natural. 
In fact, not caring non-derivatively for a family member or a friend “would 
be regarded as lacking a kind of attachment which is often a central part of 
living a significant life” (Johnston 1997: 268). The network of self-referen-
tial concerns obtains a holistic prima facie justification – these concerns are 
considered legitimate unless reasons are provided to cast doubt on some of 
them. However, they cannot all be doubted at once. This indicates why the 
discovery that there are no superlative further facts of personal identity has 
no effect on the justification of self-concern – it was never justified by the 
superlative further fact in the first place.
To clarify the irrelevance of the metaphysical underpinnings of our 
practical concerns, Johnston invokes a variant of Parfit’s teletransportation 
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thought experiment. This is framed as follows: imagine a teletransportation 
device is used to produce perfect replicas of astronauts for a deep space probe 
who would never return to earth. Suppose further that the machine leaves the 
original in a slightly worse mental shape than the replica, with mild memory 
loss and disorientation. If one conceives of this scenario from the first-person 
perspective, one can see how natural self-concern is. I would strongly prefer 
that my replica, as opposed to me, be sent on the mission. Why is that, as-
suming that my replica will be more R-related to me? Shouldn’t I strongly 
prefer that my replica stay and avoid the horrors of the space mission if what 
really matters is relation R, as Parfit suggests? Johnston claims that we take 
such a position because each of us has a bias in favor of himself and his own 
welfare as against that of strangers who happen to be R-related to him (John-
ston 1997: 274). Parfit is bound to say that the rational choice is to leave my 
replica on earth and go myself. The bizarreness of this attitude is highlighted 
by an adjustment of the scenario. Imagine that the astronaut is not me but 
a friend of mine. If what matters is relation R, I should antecedently prefer 
that my friend’s replica be left behind with me on earth. Johnston finds this 
a reductio of Parfit’s position. For Johnston, “[F]riendship does constitutively 
involve valuing the friend for his own sake and not being disposed to weaken 
the bonds of friendship just because of some psychological change in the 
friend” (Johnston 1997: 276). My friend could legitimately object that I do 
not care for him for his own sake and only care about his psychological make-
up. If what matters is psychological continuity and connectedness, as Parfit 
claims, friendship has come to an end.
This case is meant to demonstrate that concern for friends does not 
require an underlying metaphysics of friendship postulating friends as enti-
ties existing separately from their bodies, brains and functions. We would 
naturally find it absurd to demand that. At the same time, it shows that in 
the absence of such entities, we are not entitled to treat our friends as sums 
of mental and physical features that we can replace when they change. It is 
reasonable to be concerned for our friends for a simple reason – because they 
are our friends.
Analogically, even though the concern for our future selves does not 
require the existence of a soul or a res cogitans, it is not based merely on some 
notion of qualitative closeness between me and my future self. I am con-
cerned for my future self for a straightforward reason – because it will be me 
(Johnston 1997: 270).
In sum, self-referential concerns are justified by ordinary further facts 
(that one will exist, that someone is one’s friend, etc.), not superlative further 
facts, and their justification does not require any sort of metaphysical under-
pinning.
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An assessment of Johnston’s challenge
While I believe that Johnston’s arguments for the naturalness and reasonable-
ness of our concerns are sound, I think that they are consistent with the idea 
that in some cases a metaphysical theory may actually be useful in guiding us 
if the rationality of our actions is questioned.
To illustrate the usefulness of metaphysics, let me first focus on John-
ston’s contention that friendship constitutively involves valuing the friend for 
his own sake and not being disposed to weaken the bonds of friendship just 
because of some psychological change in the friend. I completely agree that 
we do not replace friends just because they have slightly changed, and that 
to do so would rightly be regarded as cold and inhuman. On the other hand, 
our own experience tells us that many friendships develop, and sometimes 
end for understandable reasons. Friends drift apart, perhaps as a result of 
other relationships they enter or political engagements they develop or the 
ideas they adopt as a result of life events. If that is so, the reason some friend-
ships end is the consequence of some sort of psychological incompatibility 
that develops between the people. This shows that there must be a threshold 
and that friendship is at least partly based on the psychological make-up of 
friends.
I completely agree with Johnston that if I recognize someone as a friend, 
I do not question whether I should care for him for his own sake. The prob-
lem is, though, how to structure our concerns for people who have changed 
so much that we are uncertain about whether they still are friends. If our 
self-referential concerns are prima-facie justified, we may simply trust our gut 
feelings and rest content with any form of attitude that we naturally adopt 
toward such people. But this would ignore the fact that in some cases the 
attitude we naturally adopt may be considered irrational by people around 
us, and we simply fail to see that. Consider, for instance, the case of a wife 
whose husband has turned into an abusive alcoholic, while she still believes 
that he is going to change and keeps forgiving his attacking her. If her attach-
ment to the husband persists, at a certain point it may become unreasonable. 
However, in interpersonal relations people do not always see the borderlines 
clearly and may adopt or retain attitudes that are inappropriate.
Respecting the analogy between the concern for friends and family and 
the concern for one’s future self, similar observations apply. My non-deriva-
tive concern about my well-being is completely natural and can withstand 
various changes in my psychology. Sometimes, however, the changes may 
be more drastic, and what the reasonable attitudes in such cases are may not 
be clear to anybody involved. A person diagnosed with dementia pondering 
whether to sign an advance directive may be an illustrative example. Someone 
might suggest, inspired by the thesis of non-derivative concern: “You should 
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be concerned for the demented person for its own sake because it will be you”. 
However, such claim simply begs the question in this scenario. Informed 
people reasonably disagree about whether the demented being will be the 
original person, and, thus, about whether her concern would be reasonable.
Another illustrative example of a case where a natural self-referential 
concern is actually present, but is very likely misplaced, is the concern that 
people in some cultures have about the way their bodies are treated after 
death. Some people prefer that their bodies be buried, rather than cremated, 
because they believe that God can resurrect the body. While we may say that 
this concern is quite natural, a careful metaphysical analysis in Shoemaker 
(2009: 23–57) shows that this practice can hardly be in their self-interest and 
help secure immortality.
Furthermore, Johnston himself allows for the possibility of a revision of 
particular concerns when he says: “One can fail to identify with one’s future 
self. But this will seem reasonable only if there is some considerable reason 
to inhibit the natural tendency to so identify, the natural tendency around 
which is built one’s concern that one’s own life continue, go well, and be 
worthwhile” (Johnston 1997: 268). Thus, it seems that even if we recognize 
that self-referential concerns are natural and generally reasonable, there are 
still cases in which we may legitimately seek reasons to care. It is the cases 
in which it is not clear whether the ordinary further facts which ground our 
concerns obtain that make us wonder what the rational thing is for us to do. 
This is where a metaphysical analysis of the relations underlying our concerns 
may play its role.4
Conclusion
We are now in the position to put the individual strands of the argument 
together. Derek Parfit believes that our practical concerns require a meta-
physical theory of personal identity to be justified. He has shown that the 
metaphysical theory that was assumed to justify the concerns is false, and that 
the true theory of personal identity, reductionism, cannot justify the con-
cerns in the form that we have been used to. Thus, the concerns have to be 
reformed. However, both Christine Korsgaard and Mark Johnston think that 
his conclusion is too hasty. Both reject Parfit’s assumption that the concerns 
are justified by means of a metaphysical theory. Korsgaard believes that the 
concerns are justified by practical necessity, given the fact that we are embod-
4 Shoemaker (2007: 346) concludes that metaphysical theory can play a revelatory role. 
It may tell us what it is that enables a person to have a special concern for her future selves 
as opposed to others and reveal heretofore-unrecognized connections between our attitudes 
towards ourselves and attitudes towards others. 
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ied and we must cooperate with whoever it is that has occupied and will oc-
cupy the body in order to live a life. The metaphysical fact that these subjects 
might not be me is practically irrelevant. Johnston argues that the practical 
concerns are justified independently of any metaphysical theory and in spite 
of the absence of the superlative further facts by the obtaining of ordinary 
further facts and by being completely natural.
I have attempted to show that the relation of unity of agency defended 
by Korsgaard is not strong enough to support the practical concerns that 
are collapsing under the attack of Parfit’s arguments. The temporal extent of 
the unity of an ordinary person is not wide enough to justify that all of the 
conscious subjects in her body are part of one encompassing project, thus 
constituting the same agent. As a result, if the unity of agency is the relation 
underlying our practical concerns, their traditional form is untenable. In fact, 
Shoemaker (1996), drawing on his conclusions about authorial disconnect-
edness, convincingly argues that agents on the Korsgaardian picture closely 
resemble selves on the Parfitian picture. Thus, if agents are the objects of our 
concerns, a revision of the concerns seems inevitable.
This similarity between the metaphysical entity of the self and the practi-
cal entity of the agent has further implications for the central question of this 
paper – the role of metaphysics. If the above arguments are correct, it would 
seem that we may simply make a choice. We may either consider ourselves 
from the theoretical perspective as selves or from the practical perspective as 
agents. The practical implications for the rationality of practical concerns will 
be similar.
I have also attempted to show that Johnston does not completely elimi-
nate the need for metaphysical analysis, either. I agree that our self-referential 
concerns are completely natural if we are certain that the ordinary further 
facts on which they rest obtain. But in many cases people are at a loss whether 
they do obtain: Is the man whom his new wife is setting against me still my 
friend? Is the adolescent who has been brainwashed by a religious cult and 
scorns everything I have taught him still my son? Will the person lying on 
the hospital bed in permanent vegetative state still be me? We do not doubt 
that all of the concerns are perfectly natural if we give a confident yes to all 
of these questions. But what is the rational stance towards these people if we 
are in doubt?
Of course, these worries are not worries about the identity of the relevant 
individuals in terms of bodily or biological continuity. Rather, the worries are 
whether the individuals are psychologically unified strongly enough for us to 
consider them to be the same agents (on Korsgaard’s theory), or whether they 
have psychologically changed so dramatically that our lack of attachment 
would not be regarded as cold and inhuman (on Johnston’s theory).
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Korsgaard’s theory would succeed in defending the traditional form of 
concerns only if our life-constituting projects extended from the first con-
scious inhabitants of our bodies to the very last ones. This would show that 
agents are practically unified from the moment consciousness first appears in 
a body until its demise, thus making metaphysical observations about unity 
irrelevant. Johnston’s theory would eliminate the need for metaphysical anal-
ysis of personal identity if for every person (including our future selves) we 
could determinately say whether or not they stand to us in the relation that 
makes the concerns that we naturally have or naturally fail to have reasonable. 
I have attempted to show that these conditions may be violated in ordinary 
lives. This leaves us with a limited, but still useful role for metaphysical analy-
sis. There are people with whom I actually fail to identify due to emotional or 
cognitive limitations. But perhaps it would be in my best interests to do so. 
There are people for whom I currently feel no non-derivative self-referential 
concern. But would it be reasonable for me to do so? Where agential unifica-
tion with and natural concern for people are actually absent, the metaphysi-
cal analysis of the underlying relations to them might tell us whether we are 
being reasonable.5
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